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The American Law School Review

Jurisprudence and the Study of Cases
By JAMES H. DRAKE
University of Michigan, Department of Law

Following the suggestion of our Chairman,
we have apparently agreed to assume that
under the theme of jurisprudence we are to
include all of the abstract, nonutilitarian
subjects bearing upon the subject of law.
Whether we call it a historical science, a
science of sciences, or a philosophy, we all
believe that it Is a valuable body of rapidly
Increasing knowledge, and our purpose now
is to determine the methodological question
as to how it can be made available for our
undergraduate students in the law school.
It is Ferrler, I believe, who says that the
philosophy of any period or any country Is
not what men have thought, but what men
have been, compelled to think, at any time
or place. Now, if we assume without at-

tempting to prove, that jurisprudence Is a
philosophy of law, we may expect to find a
close interrelation and reciprocal reaction
between the theories of American jurists and
their practical application in the courts during the past fifty years. It is the peculiar
function of teachers of law to perfect this
nexus of theory and practice, and it may
perhaps be said, without undue egotism on
the part of those present, that the law
schools have not failed to properly perform
their duty.
This especial advantage of position carries with it, of course, corresponding responsibilities. The exponents of pure scholarship seem to feel completely justified if
their results are only true and new; that
they are of no value is apparently a virtue,
rather than a shortcoming. In professional
scholarship, on the other hand, there is the
greatest insistence on the third element in
the scholarly trinity. The practical lawyer
cares but little about the absolute truth of a
legal conception, if only a majority of decisions can be found to favor it. That it is
new is frequently a good reason for rejecting
it; but it must be useful in deciding a legal
controversy, or, to put it in less invidious
form, in ameliorating our law. It has been
the glory of American legal scholarship during the past two generations that it combines, as perhaps no other subject does, pure
scholarship with professional scholarship.
Whatever the theories may be as to the nature of our subject, In the hands of American teachers. of law it has been a pragmatic
philosophy, a philosophy of results; and if
we are to keep all that we have gained by
our unique advantage of position, we must
be sure that it remains such.
Prior to the early '70's the subject of jurisprudence may be said to have been nonexistent in* American courts and American law
schools. In the courts, the cogitations that
had jurisprudential color were mainly more
or less clever guesses as to fundamental prin.
ciples, modeled on the Blackstonian "giving
of reasons," which were usually almost totally devoid of historical perspective. The
philosophic lucubrations of the jurisconsults
were, in the main, echoes of the English
analytic jurisprudence, with some attempts
to soften the vituperative crlticismu of Blackstone by Bentham and Austin.
English legal philosophy was at this time
just beginning to outgrow the limitations of
the Austinian analytical jurisprudence. The
careful scientific investigations of legal history and comparative political institutions,
by Maine, showed us that jurisprudence had
a perspective; that here, as well as in every
other field of human knowledge, we are concerned, not only with what a thing is, but
much more with how it comes to be. So far
as Maine's method is historical, It may be
thought of as a reflex of that of Savigny on
the continent, though Maine apparently nev-
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er followed Savigny In developing a philosophy of "natural law" out of his historical
material.
As an Anglo-Saxon student of
comparative law, Maine seems to hbe a forerunner of our internationally minded sociological jurisconsults here in America.
The founders and teachers of the case system would probably be surprised at being
characterized as legal philosophers; but, if
a jurisprudence of results is a philosophy,
the term Is not a misnomer, and if Ferrier's
apothegm, quoted above, is correct, LAngdell
and Ames must be as much creatures of their
time and environment as are any less Independent thinkers. The inceytion and early
development of the case system of law study
in America was alnost contemporaneous
with the beginning of historical and comparative jurisprudence In England, and may
be thought of as the pragmatic converse or
correlative of that movement. It apparently seemed to Langdell and his im-inediate
followers only a new and better method of
teaching law, and our pedagogical friends
might find in it, if they had ever discovered
its existence, a great triumph of their favorite subject of methodology. It was the right
way to do it, and in doing it in the right way
these professional teachers of law, the American jurisconsults, keeping their feet on the
solid earth, necessarily made great advances
in legal theory, and developed a school of
American historical jurisprudence. When
student and teacher started together with
the case, then each could fully realize that
law had a history.'
The new method of approach also developed a jurisprudence of rights rather than
one of rules. This was~brought about by a
simple change in method from one that was
mainly deductive to one predominantly inductive. This slight change in emphasis has
gone far toward rescuing our law schools,
and then our courts, from the mechanical or
epithetical jurisprudence, inherited by the
courts of the nineteenth century from the
deductive legal method of the eighteenth cenfury. The great achievements of American
jurists in the nineteenth century are due to
the return to the original source, and to the
emphasis on induction as a means of determining the rights of the parties litigant,
' The career of the agistor's lien might have been
very different if, in 1839, Baron Parke could have
had before him the first volume of Gray's Cases
on Property, with ifssimple Juxtaposition of Chapman v. Allen (1632) and Jackson v. Cummins (1839)
together with the note from Ames' History of Assumpsit. We should have been saved our wanderings in the maze of crisscross decisions and corrective statutes of the past century which have
been necessary in order to re-establish the historical truth that the agistor and all his ilk, including his ancient and modern analogees, the
liveryman and the garage man, have a lien, and
that the right depends upon service performed, and
not upon any of the fanciful reasons imagined by
the post-Blackstonians.
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rather than upon deduction from legal rpaxims, definitions, or rules.2
By the end of the last century our Ameri,can jurisconsults, working with their students, have developed an American historical
jurisprudence of rights; but at the beginning
of the present century, either because the
war of 1898 had made us think Internationally rather than parochially, or because our
case system as a pragmatic historical jurisprudence had reached Its maturity, our ju-isconsults-again mainly teachers of law"4iscovered Continental Europe, and, under the
leadership of a Northwestern and a "Downeastern" Dean, we seem to be in a fair way
to develop an American sociological jurisprudence.
The inception and careful, scholarly elaboration of the Modbrn Legal Philosophy Series, the Continental Legal History Series,
the Modern Criminal Science Series, and the
Evolution of Law Series has given to us a
great body of source material for the study
of comparative law and modern jurisprudence and sociology. They perform a service for sociological jurisprudence comparable
to that performed by the great series of casebooks for American historical jurisprudence.
The many learned essays in our current legal literature-again mainly from professors
of law-have shown us how we may hope to
develop an American sociological jurisprudence.
This development of sociological theory
has already reacted directly upon our courts.
Mr. Justice Brewer, In Mueller v. Oregon,
takes "judicial cogpizance" of the careful
economic and social studies of Mr. Brandeis.
It vnay perhaps be noted In passing that the
later appointment of Mr. Brandeis to the Supreme Bench has some very striking analogies to the granting of the jus respondendi
to skilled jurisconsulti by Augustus, and the
practice so common afterward of putting the
most learned of these jurisconsults in charge
2How much difficulty the courts and litigants
would have been saved in working out the law of
fixtures, if they had started from the standpoint
of the facts in litigation and worked inductively
toward the rights of the parties, rather than beginning with a definition as a basic principle of law,
and proceeding deductively to the application of the
rule.
By the inductive process we avoid all the
pitfalls of the undistributed middle.
The terrors of this logical fallacy are felt most
keenly in cases involving a psychological element
In Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N. Y. 107
(1896), the court decided that, as no recovery can
be had for fright occasioned by the negligence of
another, the defendant would not be liable for the
consequences of fright.
The reasoning seems to
be:
Fright as a cause of action is zero, but ex
nihilo nihil fit (cf. Lucretius, De Rer. Nat. I, 156);
ergo, the result is zero. Q. E. D. But it is wrong,
because "zero" is used in the sense of "a cause

of action," and not in the sense "a proximate
cause" of an injury; and the plaintiff gets no redress for proved mental and physical injury, which
is the proximate result of the negligence of the
defendant.
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of the Supreme Court, as prafectus praetorio.
With Justice Brandeis and Justice Holmes
on the Supreme Bench, and with the precedent in Mueller v. Oregon, we can hardly deny that sociological jurisprudence has found
a place in our highest tribunal, and that the
pure legal scholarship of both our historical
and sociological periods has found a practical
and valuable application in. the courts.
But how are we going to get these results
Into the consciousness of our undergraduate §tudents, so that we may hope through
them to influence our courts and our system
of law? We probably all agree, with our
Chairman, that courses in juristic survey,
however d~sirable they may seem, a priori,
have not been a practical success, and most
of us are somewhat doubtful as to whether
they can ever he made such. Courses in
legal history are already given in several
schools. They have been fairly successful,
and no one questions their desirability, at
least for graduate students. For undergraduates they have the great pedagogical advantage that much of the source material Is
in the cases. Furthermore, the material outside the cases is not so voluminous as to be
unmanageable, in what may be called casebook forn. The type of instruction, therefore, may be the proseminarial form of professional scholarship rather than the seminarial form of the graduate courses.
When we come to the subject of courses in
formal jurisprudence for undergraduates,
one of the chief difficulties seems to be that
we have not yet fully digested our material.
If we are going to retain for these courses
the unique advantage of our case study, we
must reduce our material to the compass of
the ordinary casebook. The difficulty of accomplishing this was very greatly increased
when we passed out of our historical stage
of jurisprudential study, at the beginning
of this century, and began the approach from
the side of comparative law and sociological
interpretation. This difficulty.has been solved in the graduate courses in jurisprudence
by what seems to be a reversion from the
case method, properly speaking, to the old
method of lectures, with illustrative readings, and there is a general reluctance on the
part of law teachers to return to this with
undergraduate students.
When we have reduced our nterial to a
manageable form we shall still have the
question to answer as to whether it Is better to put this into one casebook, or a series,
for one or more synthetic courses, or to have
it incorporated in each of our courses, which,
as they have in the past so successfully
taught the law from the standpoint of historical jurisprudence, may be reasonably expected to teacl it sociologically, leaving the
formal, synthetic process for our graduate
courses.
The lesser philosophic categories of jurisprudence, such as possession, jura In rem
and jura in personam, etc., have been taught

very satisfactorily in connection with the
courses in which they are naturally suggested by the cases. No better setting for
elucidating the distinction between a jus in
personnin and a jus in rem could probably be
found than the cases involving the nonassignability of the lien and the full assignabilIty of the pledge. Savigny's elaboration of
Ulpian's theory of animus and corpus in possession fits naturally into a discussion of
our cases on trespass to possession, while
Ihering's criticism of that theory as naturally belongs in a consideration of the cases on
custody.
As soon as our casebooks are perfected,3
we may make jurisprudence an undergraduate subject, with the hope that students will
elect it. Some of us, who have been trying
the experiment in past years, have found
that seniors are liable to elect casebook
courses to the exclusion of the more abstract
subject. It is also true that some who do
elect it arc victims of philosophic neasles,
and have hopes that maybe the courses in
jurisprudence will tell them what a "legal
absolute" is. On the other hand, If the
course Is put among the required subjects, it
forces in many who have an idiosyncrasy
antipathetic to all abstract reasoning, and
most of us shrink from lecturing to such a
cllent(le.
Until we have overcome these practical
difficulties of presentation, we shall probably
have to be content with our present instrumentalities for getting the conclusions of
sociological jurisprudence into the legal consciousness, by teaching our teachers of law
and allowing them to pass it over to their
students as occasion may arise In the study
of cases. These questions of methodology
can, however, be answered only In the timehonored American way of making a trial of
the plan suggested, and most of us will probably be willing to follow our Chairman In
making the test.

I We are told that there are two such casebooks
In preparation, one by Dr. Sherman, the learned

author of the Roman Law in the Modern World.

The readings in Roman Law and In jurisprudence
assigned in the graduate course at Harvard would

seem to be quite suitable for this purpose, but
those in Roman Law have been printed only in
part, while those in jurisprudence exist only In

typewritten form.
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